If delegates thought the opening day of Combat Engineer & Logistics 2026 was content-rich — and it was — then Day #2 raised that bar higher still.
The middle day of the conference staged in Krakow, Poland, saw the agenda split into streams, each with its own distinct focus on different aspects of these wide-ranging disciplines.
One early presentation centred on Canada’s approach to extending operational reach in the North and sustaining forces in extreme environments.
The audience was reminded that 40% of the nation’s area sat within the Arctic Circle, including an archipelago of 36,000 islands, yet it was populated by only about 250,000.
Climate change is naturally one of the area’s most pressing concerns: it was warming up four times faster than any other region on the planet. As the speaker remarked: “About 100 years ago, there was a saying that we really lived ‘in a fire-proof house’ – an ice-covered land that formed a natural barrier… fast forward 100 years and that is no longer true.”
The audience heard that much of what little military infrastructure exists in the High North at present dates back to the Cold War era, to the 1950s through to the 1970s. Canada was now looking at the region in terms of threats through the Arctic, and threats to the Arctic.
At present, the speaker said, operational reach — the distance and duration at which Canadian forces could operate — was low, so the intention was to switch to a ‘hub-and-node’ model. Three hubs serving the West , North and East have already been identified: Inuvik, Yellowknife and Iqaliut.
And the speaker added: “The interesting concept around this is that we are thinking on every level about what could be dual-use.”
The audience also heard Canada was planning on stepping up its episodic and formerly biannual Operation Nanook into a seven-times-a-year event to provide a permanent presence in the Arctic which aims to detect, deter and defend against potential adversaries. And at least one of the seven annual iterations will be engineer-focused.
And it was also made clear that Canada intends to make good use of the expertise of its indigenous populations as it proceeds; the speaker cited a locally well-known mantra: “Nothing about us, without us.”
Later in another theatre, there was the chance to understand the shift to a contested logistics mindset from a NATO perspective. The audience was given the essence of a not-yet officially validated but soon-to-be-introduced alliance doctrine.
The thrust of the argument was that post-Ukraine, we are re-entering an era of symmetric warfare, and while old Cold-War-era principles still apply, they have to be updated to take account of new technological developments, particularly the prevalence of drones.
Five key tenets were identified: to develop resilient and protected networks; employ agile and adaptive logistics; implement dispersed and autonomous sustainment; conduct data-driven and integrated command and control (C2); and promote industrial and production resilience.
Resilient networks demanded dual-use transport modes, and reduced detectability via decoys, reduced thermal and electromagnetic signatures, and varied timings of convoys..
Agile and adaptive logistics needed to be modular and flexible; employing dispersed and autonomous sustainment meant increased experimenting with and utilisation of uncrewed air and ground systems, as well as additive manufacturing capabilities, smart warehousing, and dispersed logistics hubs.
Achieving data-driven and integrated C2 required accurate and real-time situational awareness and federated, standardised and interoperable networks, And better industrial resilience demanded supply diversification where possible, and harnessing innovative technologies to maintain output under duress.
Asked in the ensuing Q&A session what NATO was doing in exercises to replicate logistics challenges in fully contested environments, he replied: “I have been in logistics for 30 years… what I can say is it’s always the same, our big chiefs say we don’t want to be impacted by logistics because the exercise only lasts ten days, so logistics situation is always ‘green light’
“In the last year that has changed; in our last ‘Steadfast’ operation the logistics situation was orange… When there is a war we have to take into account that the logistics situation is not always green.”
Another interesting point raised was that more dispersed logistics also meant more assets needed to defend them, taking away from front-line offensive capabilities; it was agreed that a balance needed to be struck.
Elsewhere, delegates were treated to an excellent presentation from the Polish perspective on advancing a multi-modal movement network for its own armed forces and those of NATO more generally.
It took in regulatory and legal aspects, such as NATO Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) and the Polish Act of the Defence of the Homeland, both elements in ensuring freedom of movement for military capabilities both domestic and multinational.
They help define optimal procedures for cross-border movements, and reduce delays for outsized convoys and hazardous materials both for military exercises and in times of crisis.
They also ensure that new dual-use infrastructure road and rail projects — some of them funded by EU programmes — are suitable for heavy military vehicles. They also allow for 24/7 military traffic management and designated and predefined routes within the national road system.
The comprehensive presentation also included a detailed look at the North Corridor, a cross-national supply route spanning the Netherlands, Germany and Poland, one of six such transport corridors.
The speaker suggested the North Corridor should be held up as an example of how to co-operate and simplify procedures, and used as a model throughout the rest of NATO for the best way to integrate maritime access, utilise high-capacity rail networks and upgrade road infrastructure to enable seamless military and commercial transport.
The speaker warned against reducing future budgets set aside for infrastructure and mobility programmes, saying studies had suggested necessary works to be carried out would cost in the region of €70 billion.
Future challenges, he suggested, included managing simultaneous military and civilian traffic, and ensuring cybersecurity. And he challenged other EU states to make good on historical pledges of cutting the red tape surrounding cross-border mobility.
He said: “In 2018 the EU committed to shortening the time taken to procure cross-border permits; in 2026 we still have countries that require extra time. The EU needs to remove procedures which restrict freedom of movement for military forces.”
A different theatre provided insights into how some NATO nations are working together to deliver the next generation of bridging equipment.
The presentation began with an overview of the many ways in which partners could collaborate.These included participation in NATO MilEng working groups, where different nations share best practices and also hammer out NATO STANAGs.
There are industry advisory groups, some of them tasked with answering NATO-funded capability requests, and the option to send soldiers on NATO MIlEng Centre of Excellence (CoE) courses. Interested parties were also urged to take advantage of national agreements and treaties, Mod and ministerial-leve visits, and joint procurement and lifecycle management agencies such as the NSPA and OCCAR.
Moving into specifics, the presenters outlined some British case studies with multinational involvement in bridging programmes, including the dry-gap Project Tyro General Support Bridge (GSB) and Close Support Bridge (CSB).
The Tyro GSB project involves Germany and the Netherlands, should be in full production from 2028, and may possibly be joined by Denmark as well.
Its sister Tyro CSB programme, aka the Boxer Vehicle-Launched Bridge (BVLB) will provide a 14-metre gap-bridging capability with a maximum load capacity (MLC) of 100 tonnes; a 26-metre, 50-tonne capability is also being explored.
And there was also a focus on what the British call Project Triton, its primary project in next-generation wide wet gap crossing (WWGC) capability, based on General Dynamics’ M3 platform. This programme, carried out in conjunction with Germany, is OCCAR-managed.
Key criteria included for the new capability to be able to cross WWGs over 40m, to provide an increased MLC of 100 tonnes (enough to accommodate a Challenger 3 tank); for it to be operationally mobile on land, & configurable to a fixed bridge or mobile ferry on water; and for it to be fully interoperable with fellow German units, delivering 300m of sovereign WWGC capability and 900m when operated jointly.
One of two speakers presenting said: “For the past six years the U.K. and Germany have worked tirelessly to bring this project to fruition.”
Sometimes it had been necessary for both sides to compromise on national requirements, but the result was an interoperable platform with about 90% complete harmonisation between the two nations’ variants.
The contract had been signed in October 2025; it’s hoped trials of the new vehicles will start in 2029-30. Cited lessons learned included all nations are different, there’s no ‘right’ answer, and flexibility was a virtue, as was asking, ‘Is difference worth it?’
Escalation to higher levels was fine on rare occasions where fundamental points of difference really could not be reconciled, and there was great merit in agreeing high-level requirements early on.
Ongoing lines of work are looking at optimising personnel requirements for the platforms in terms of remote or autonomous operation where practical, and both nations are open to the possibility of other nations joining the OCCAR programme if they desire.
An afternoon presentation in one theatre gave an overview of what operational energy superiority and sustaining forces across domains looked like from a British perspective.
The speaker remarked how, particularly post-Ukraine, energy had been “weaponised”, although the roots of this dated back much further, a cited example being the British bombing campaign targeting energy industries in 1944 that dented German industrial output.
More recently, of course, Russia has been weaponising energy by targeting oil and gas supplies and critical energy infrastructure in Ukraine.
Another factor is the trend of increasing energy demands: the audience heard how the energy requirements per soldier in WW2 were estimated at one gallon of fuel per day; by the 1990s in Iraq this had climbed to 15-20 gallons per soldier per day.
New air platforms such as the F-35 are significantly more power-hungry than their predecessors; directed energy weapons being touted as counter-drone solutions also have very high power generation demands, not to mention requirements to power the digital fight and AI capabilities.
The speaker said renewable energy sources with power generated close to the point of need was part of the solution, as was an increased drive for efficiency, adding: “Energy planning needs to be instinctive.”
Pressed during the Q&A on whether Britain was or should be investigating using nuclear micro-reactors, he wouldn’t be drawn on specifics but admitted the technology was proven, and there was a need to quantify likely force-level energy demands “within a year, possibly even within months.”
And he added that one question in the area which perhaps hadn’t yet been given due consideration was whether other states would necessarily be happy about forces deploying nuclear-powered mini-reactors on their sovereign territories.
His overall message, though was: “I think the challenges can be met: we can do this through innovation, efficiency, and partnerships and collaboration.”
Throughout the day briefs kept coming thick and fast. In one theatre, delegates heard about progress on Project Weevil, the British Army’s automated mine clearance project.
It took in minefield identification, breaching strategies, and the use of autonomous systems not only to carry these tasks out, but also to guard perimeters automatically, because “the moment you breach a minefield it’s not just open to you, it’s open to the enemy.”
The speaker also noted: “We also need to take industry advice on what is not achievable, and what can be done in the next five to ten years, because we need to get after this.”
Elsewhere the audience listened to potential uses of small modular and mobile nuclear reactors in both military and civilian contexts, including rear-area power generation units plugged into grids or mobile energy storage solutions, and maritime power barge turnkey solutions.
Compact molten salt reactors were one possible solution; one advantage of such systems being that they don’t produce large amounts of heat, and therefore have lower thermal signatures, making them harder to target by an adversary.
In future, nuclear-powered icebreakers and/or cargo ships might come into increasing use on the Northern Sea Route. This route, increasingly available as the effects of climate change take hold, reduces shipping distances between Shanghai and Rotterdam by about 40%: circa 13,700km instead of almost 21,000km.
What’s more, the speaker said, Russia was an acknowledged current global leader in this technology, using reactors for parts of its naval fleet and with more established infrastructure in this part of the world than other nations.
One other potential use-case cited for small nuclear reactors, particularly ship-based ones, was for disaster relief. The example cited was the Beirut port explosion in 2020 which devastated local infrastructure: SAR and reconstruction power demands could have been met from the sea.
Obstacles included potential regulatory hurdles and political resistance to nuclear power use at the nation-state level, and the large initial costs of developing and implementing these technologies.
Later on a German speaker gave a fascinating presentation on the Bundeswehr’s approach to additive manufacturing.
His main messages were simple: firstly, “3D printing is valuable in peacetime and priceless in wartime.” Secondly, “Small, robust and cheap 3D printers are the key to successful implementation.”
The time between the decision to procure 3D printers and the first examples being delivered to the Bundeswehr was less than one year; the speaker said: “I’m pretty proud of that: as a number it’s not light speed, but in terms of German Armed Forces, it kind of broke the sound barrier!”
He characterised the choice to deploy small numbers of simple systems fast, then review, adjust and reiterate, as a switch from a ‘waterfall’ method to one of ‘continuous feedback.’ He extolled it as a great system for any procurement process.
The 3D printers had been a great success, he said. Evaluated in terms of numbers of problems solved, documented figures climbed steadily from 2023-2025 and would have been even higher, but “soldiers love solving problems, but hate doing paperwork.”
Examples of 3D-printed plastic and metal solutions cited included thousands of connectors that enabled legacy night-vision systems to be fitted to new combat troop helmets, hundreds of suspension protectors to stop wear on vehicles’ springs, and ship ventilation connection parts that would have been uneconomical for commercial firms to produce because they were needed in relatively small numbers.
The speaker rhetorically asked: “What would have happened without 3D printers? I have bad news: not everything can be fixed with duct tape.”
He said the proof of success was that soldiers were using 3D printers a lot and even buying their own, while the Bundeswehr was not only looking to purchase lots more, but also manage and integrate the self-acquired systems into its own framework.
And another eye-opening presentation was delivered on strategic air lifts, specifically what is now named the Strategic Air Lift International Solution (SALIS).
It dates way back to 1999 and was originally part-delivered by Russians and Ukrainians in partnership, hard as that seems to believe today.
Russian involvement ceased, understandably enough, in 2019: these days their chief involvement is attempting to destroy the Ukranian arm of the operation.
After attacks that damaged large parts of the fleet of the Antonov planes it operates, the Ukrainian arm, Antonov Airlines, relocated its base of operations to Leipzig Airport in Germany to take it beyond the reach of attacks as far as possible.
Nonetheless, a first set of Russian strikes in 2022 destroyed planes including its sole, hugely capable AN-225, an aircraft with a payload of 300 tonnes; further strikes in April 2025 on its manufacturing plantain Kyiv saw 32 out of 48 buildings systematically targeted and damaged or destroyed.
In happier news, a new hangar is being constructed at Leipzig to facilitate maintenance of the five-to-seven AN-124s SALIS still operates; it should be completed in 2027.
And the planes themselves are still flown for 1,600 flight hours a year, divided among the member states which make up the SALIS programme; though most are NATO members, the programme itself does not have NATO status.
Examples of flights arranged at short notice include humanitarian aid to Turkey in the wake of its recent earthquake. In terms of capacity the AN-124 is unrivalled: by way of example it can accommodate a CH-47 Chinook helicopter, two main battle tanks, 12 ISO containers or even 48 S-Class Mercedes cars.
The AN124 will reach the end of its lifecycle in between 13 and 20 years; at present viable alternatives are thin on the ground (a C-17 is significantly smaller).
An EDA study is ongoing but has yet to identify high-level requirements; one potential commercial solution is the even larger Radia Windrunner, a platform conceived as air transport for wind turbine blades. A prototype is scheduled for 2026;to time will tell if this comes to fruition.
This fascinating talk was a fitting end to a fantastic second day at CEL 2026: we look forward to equally rewarding closing sessions tomorrow.
